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LAW AND THE DEMISE
OF THE URBAN GHETTO
PART 11 *
This is the second of a two-part article examining the
impact of recent developments in the law upon the urban
ghetto. Part I, which appeared in the Winter issue of THE
CATHOLIC LAWYER,1 discussed the ramifications of the
expansive interpretation of the thirteenth amendment adopted
by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
In view of the recent Congressional response to the problems
of the urban ghetto, Part II focuses its attention upon the
scope of the open-housing section of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, as well as the constitutional obstacles confronting
it.
Of all the races and varieties of men which have suffered .
the colored people of this country have endured most. They can
resort to no disguises which will enable them to escape.
[discrimination's] deadly aim. They carry in front the evidence which
marks them for persecution. They stand at the extreme point of
difference from the Caucasian race, and their African origin can
be instantly recognized. . . . They may remonstrate like Shylock . . .
"Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions,
senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with
the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the
same means, warmed and cooled by the same summer and winter,
as a Christian is?" - but such eloquence is unavailing. They are
Negroes-and that is enough, in the eye of this unreasoning prejudice,
to justify indignity and violence. In nearly every department of
American life they are confronted by this insidious influence ...
Without crime or offense against law or gospel, the colored man
is the Jean Valjean of American society. He has escaped from the
galleys, and hence all presumptions are against him. The workshop
denies him work, and the inn denies him shelter; the ballot-box a fair
vote, and the jury-box a fair trial. He has ceased to be the slave
of an individual, but has in some sense become the slave of society.
He may not now be bought and sold like a beast in the market,
but he is the trammeled victim of a prejudice, well calculated to
repress his manly ambition, paralyze his energies, and make him a
dejected and spiritless man ... 2
* This paper was prepared by the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal
Research.
'Law and the Demise of the Urban Ghetto, 15 CATH. LAW. 39 (1969).
2 DOUGLASS, The Color Line, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS
343-44 (1955).
It is a tragic commentary on American
life that one unacquainted with the liter-
ary efforts of the abolitionist Frederick
Douglass would not immediately recognize
that the above passage was written in
description of the plethora of discrimina-
tions confronting the black man in nine-
teenth-century America. Indeed, in con-
trast to the revolutions we have witnessed
in space, automation, and weaponry, it is
shocking that the black man remains a
pariah in our society.'
After the adoption of the thirteenth
amendment, Congress enacted legislation
designed to protect and guarantee the civil
rights of the black American.' The sub-
sequent occurrence of two events, how-
ever, effectively destroyed the substantive
equal protection Congress had attempted
to ensure. The political Compromise of
1877 marked the abdication by the fed-
eral government of its role in the area
of civil rights, and the conclusion of the
reconstruction era.5 The judicial counter-
part to this political abdication occurred
in 1883, when the Supreme Court emas-
culated the legislation which had been
enacted by the Reconstruction Congress
with its decision in the Civil Rights
Cases.6 While the Court invalidated only
sections one and two of the Civil Rights
3 See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
669-93 (1944) for an extensive discussion of
the black American's lower caste status.
4See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866,
ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Enforcement Act of May
31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144; Act of
February 28, 1871, 17 Stat. 3; Ku Klux Klan
Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights
Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
5 See J. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER
THE CIVIL WAR 212-17 (1961).
6 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Act of 1875,1 the majority opinion of
Mr. Justice Bradley, adopting a highly
restrictive interpretation of the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments, denied that
Congress possessed the power to prohibit
private acts of discrimination.
Deprived of federal protection in this
manner, the black American has been
alienated from the mainstream of Amer-
ican life. He has been thrust into the
ghetto environment, and has suffered all
of its concomitant discriminations.8 How-
ever, as the pervasive social, economic
and political problems emanating from
this ghetto phenomenon have grown more
explosive, the federal government has been
compelled to re-adopt its protective role
in this area. Thus in 1968, in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.," the Supreme
Court held that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 10 prohibited private discrimination
against the black American in the sale
and leasing of housing. The Court jus-
tified its broad interpretation of the long-
dormant 1866 Act as a valid exercise of
congressional power under section two
of the thirteenth amendment to prohibit
the badges or incidents of slavery. The
second part of this article will examine
Congress' response to this problem of
the urban ghetto-Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.11
7 Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
8 See Law and the Demise of the Urban Ghetto,
15 CATHOLIC LAW. 39-31 (1969).
9 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
'(Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
11Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (hereinafter
cited as Act of 1968).
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Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968
While the reconstruction statute 12 con-
strued by the Jones Court [presently cod-
ified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982] is certainly
not a comprehensive open housing law,
Congress did enact such a law on April
11, 1968. In contrast to section 1982,
which simply prohibits discrimination
against black Americans, Title VIII was
enacted to eliminate discrimination in res-
idential housing on grounds of race, color,
religion, or national origin. It prohibits
discrimination in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of a sale or rental of housing,' 3
as well as a refusal to sell, rent, or
negotiate after a bona fide offer is re-
ceived.14  In addition, Title VIII specific-
ally prohibits discrimination in the pro-
vision of services or facilities in con-
nection with the sale or rental of a dwell-
ing. For example, publication of a no-
tice, statement, or advertisement indicat-
ing an intent to discriminate is pro-
hibited.' 5 An even more valuable pro-
tection is afforded the black American
by section 804(e), which drastically cur-
tails the practice of "blockbusting." It
prohibits an attempt to induce, or an
actual inducement for profit to any per-
son to sell or rent any dwelling, by rep-
12The 1866 Act was subsequently codified in
§§ 1977, 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874,
now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982. Section 1982,
under which the Jones action was brought,
simply reads: "All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and
convey real and personal property.
13 Act of 1968, § 804(b), 82 Stat. 83.
'41d. at § 804(a), 82 Stat. 83.
15id. at § 804(c), 82 Stat. 83.
resentations regarding the entry or pros-
pective entry into a neighborhood of a
person of a particular race, color, re-
ligion, or national origin. Scare tactics
of this type have been utilized in the
past to induce the widespread evacuation
by whites of a newly-integrated neighbor-
hood.' 6
Title VIII of the 1968 Act also ex-
tends its coverage to discrimination in
financing arrangements and in the pro-
vision of brokerage services. It was evi-
dent to the legislators that real estate
dealers, as well as finance and brokerage
groups, often played an important part
in the maintenance of housing patterns
based upon race.' As a result of their
belief that only a "homogeneous" neigh-
borhood would provide stable property
values, these groups have traditionally op-
posed all attempts to eliminate racial
segregation in housing.' Indeed as re-
cently as 1951, racial discrimination was
codified as the official policy of the Na-
tional Association of Real Estate Boards.1 9
In order to remedy this situation, Title
VIlI prohibits any enterprise engaged in
the business of making commercial real
estate loans from discriminating against
I, Hearings Before Subconi. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2nd Sess., ser. 16, at 1218-19 (1966) (herein-
after cited as 1966 Hearings Before Subcomm.
No. 5). See also 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER
& N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 2063-65 (1967).
'7 1966 Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 at
1069.
18 1962 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Civil Rights U. S. A.,
Housing in Washington, D. C. at 12-15.
19 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381
(1967) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas).
any person applying for financial assist-
ance for the purchase, construction, im-
provement, repair or maintenance of a
dwelling.2 Similarly, multiple-listing serv-
ices and brokerage organizations are pro-
hibited from excluding or refusing their
services or membership therein to per-
sons who sell or rent housing in a non-
discriminatory manner.2 1 It is hoped that
the latter provision will eliminate the
fears of competitive loss and reprisal
which might otherwise compel the adop-
tion of a policy of segregation by a
builder or landlord. 22
In contrast to the exhaustive provisions
of Title VIII, section 1982 does not
explicitly deal with any of those fields of
activity which are related to the sale or
rental of housing. It is without doubt
that the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not en-
vision the 1866 Act to be a comprehen-
sive open housing statute. Instead, it
merely decreed that the black American
"shall have the same right . . . to make
and enforce contracts . . . [and] to in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property . ..
as is enjoyed by white citizens. . "
Yet it is equally true that the language
of this Act may be broad enough to pro-
vide protection for the black American
against discrimination in the services or
facilities ancillary to the sale or rental
of housing. For example, the term "prop-
erty" utilized in the 1866 Act may be
construed to include such ancillary serv-
20 Act. of 1968, § 805, 82 Stat. 83.
21.d at § 806, 82 Stat. 84.
22 1966 Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 at
1069.
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ices or facilities.2 3 In the alternative, re-
liance may be placed upon the Act's
prohibition of racial discrimination in the
formation and enforcement of contracts.
2 4
Thus a finance group would be prohibited
from discriminating in the terms or con-
ditions of a loan solely on the basis of
the customer's black skin. It is import-
ant to note however, that neither pro-
vision would deny the institution its tra-
ditional right to deal with whomsoever it
pleased; rather, the institution would
merely be prohibited from discriminating
solely on the basis of race.
25
Coverage of Title VIII
Section 803 of Title VIII outlines sev-
eral important exceptions to the Act's cov-
erage. For example, the sale or rental of
a single family dwelling is exempted, as
long as the owner does not own more
than three such homes at any one time,
and as long as it is the first such sale
within any twenty-four month period.2 6
However, after December 31, 1969, this
exemption remains available only if a
real estate agent or broker is not in-
volved in the transaction. The exemp-
tion is further narrowed by limiting the
right of the owner of an ordinarily ex-
empt family dwelling, to publish, post,
or mail any discriminatory advertisement
which would otherwise violate the pro-
visions of Title VIII.27 Once he receives
actual notice of the possible consequences
23 See Law and the Demise of the Urban
Ghetto, 15 CATHOLic LAW. 39, 52-4 (1969).
24 Id.
25 Id.
2 6 Act of 1968, §803(b)(1), 82 Stat. 82.
27Id. at §803(b)(1)(b), 82 Stat. 82.
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of advertising in this manner, he be-
comes subject to the sanctions provided
in the Act .2 In addition, a Mrs. Murphy
type boarding house-one containing
quarters intended to be occupied by no
more than four families, living inde-
pendent of each other, one of such quar-
ters being occupied by the owner, Mrs.
Murphy, as her residence-is also ex-
empted from the coverage of Title VIII.2
9
A less significant exemption permits a
religious organization to limit the sale,
rental or occupancy of dwellings which
it owns or operates for a non-commercial
purpose to co-religionists, unless member-
ship in the religion itself is restricted on
the basis of race, color, or national
origin."0 A similar exemption is pro-
vided for private clubs "not in fact open
to the public," which, as an incident to
their primary purpose, own or operate
lodgings on a non-commercial basis.3 1
In contrast to the exemptions permitted
by Congress in the 1968 Act, section
1982 simply prohibits all discrimination
in the sale or rental of property. It is
probable, however, that similar exemptions
will be carved out of that blanket pro-
hibition by ensuing judicial interpreta-
tions of that section. For instance, it
is extremely questionable whether section
1982 could be enforced against the own-
er of a two family dwelling, who oc-
cupies one apartment and discriminatorily
refuses to rent the other to a black
28 Id.
291d. at §803(b)(2), 82 Stat. 82. Mrs. Mur-
phy is the archetypal elderly widow who at-
tempts to supplement her meager pension by
accepting boarders into her home.
30 Act of 1968, § 807, 82 Stat. 84.
31 Id.
American. Of primary concern is wheth-
er or not a basic natural right-the right
to privacy 32-would be violated if sec-
tion 1982's broad prohibition is to en-
joy literal application. In Bell v. Mary-
land,3  Mr. Justice Goldberg, in a con-
curring opinion, stated:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are
regrettable, but it is the constitutional
right of every person to close his home
or club to any person or to choose
his social intimates and business part-
ners solely on the basis of personal
prejudices, including race. These and
other rights pertaining to privacy and
private association are themselves con-
stitutionally protected liberties. 4
The Bell Court had been confronted with
a claim of equal access to public ac-
commodations, and the relationship be-
tween the modern restauranteur and his
customer was characterized as relatively
impersonal and evanescent. "This is not
a claim which significantly impinges upon
personal associational interests .. . [t]he
proprietor's interest in private or unre-
stricted association is slight." 3 Thus Mr.
Justice Goldberg concluded that "[t]he
right to be served in places of public
accommodation regardless of color can-
not constitutionally be subordinated to
the proprietor's interest in discriminatorily
32 While the right of privacy is not explicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has found the right to be within the
penumbra of the first, third, fourth, fifth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments. See Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488
(1965).
.93378 U.S. 226 (1964).
34d. at 238.
5 d. at 242.
refusing service".16 It is clear, however,
that the associational interests of the two
family dwelling owners cannot be dis-
missed as easily. As the relations be-
tween an owner and his tenants become
more intimate, a delicate balancing of the
individual rights involved will be required
if unconstitutional infringement of either
right is to be avoided.
Enforcement
Title VIII of the 1968 Act expressly
authorizes three alternative methods of
enforcement: administrative conciliation
under the supervision of the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, 7 pri-
vate civil actions, 3s and suits brought by
the Attorney General. 39 The latter are
limited to those situations in which a
person is engaged in a pattern or practice
of discrimination in violation of the Act,
or in which an issue of general public
importance has been raised by the denial
of equal housing to any group of per-
sons. The individual is authorized to
enforce his own rights under Title VIII
by civil actions in any Federal district
court, regardless of the amount in con-
troversy, or in appropriate state or local
courts. Various forms of relief are avail-
able, including permanent and temporary
injunctions, temporary restraining orders,
actual damages, and punitive damages not
2 6 d.
."Act of 1968, § 810, 82 Stat. 85.
'8Id. at §812, 82 Stat. 88.
391d. at §813(a), 82 Stat. 88.
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exceeding one thousand dollars.4
0
In order to vindicate their rights under
section 1982, petitioners in Jones had
invoked the jurisdiction of the federal
district court to award damages or equit-
able relief under any Congressional act
providing for the protection of civil
rights.4' In these circumstances, the
amount in controversy need not exceed
$10,000 to invoke federal jurisdiction.4 2
It is not yet clear, however, what forms
of relief will be available to provide vin-
dication for those rights guaranteed by
section 1982. The Jones Court, utilizing
its traditional power to fashion an ef-
fective equitable remedy, granted the pe-
titioners the right to buy a home at the
price prevailing at the time of the wrong-
ful refusal to sell.43  However, the Court
declined to decide whether section 1982
created an implied right to compensatory
or punitive damages. 44  In any event, it
is clear that civil damages under section
1983 41 or criminal penalties under sec-
40Id. at §812(c), 82 Stat. 88. In order to
partially alleviate the difficulties which con-
fronted petitioners who had attempted to en-
force their rights under section 1982, § 812(c)
also empowers the court to award attorney's
fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
41 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (Supp. 1966). This
section provides that "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction in any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any
person: To recover damages or to secure
equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights, including the right to vote."
42 Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157, 161 (1943); Hague v. Committee for In-
dustrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 507-14
(1939).
43392 U.S. 409, 414 (1968).
44 Id. at 414 n.14.
45 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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tion 242 46 could not be invoked since
both sections apply only to acts "under
color of law". On the other hand,
when two or more persons join in a
conspiracy to violate section 1982, both
civil damages and criminal penalties are
available under section 1985 (3)47 and
section 241.48 It is submitted, however,
that injunctive relief will usually be suf-
ficient to vindicate section 1982 rights.
The Constitution and Title VIII
The Fair Housing Title of the 1968
Civil Rights Act presents several inter-
esting constitutional questions. Jones
has now conclusively established that the
thirteenth amendment empowers Congress
to prohibit all discrimination which it
rationally concludes imposes a badge or
incident of slavery upon black Americans.
The next problem, however, is to dis-
cover a constitutional basis for legisla-
tion which prohibits discrimination based
upon other factors, such as Congress has
attempted to do in Title VIII. It is
possible to construe this legislation as
a valid exercise of Congressional power
under several different constitutional theo-
ries.
A.) The Congressional power to regu-
late interstate commerce.
The commerce clause of article one
grants Congress plenary power to regu-
late, protect, and promote interstate com-
merce in all its forms. Chief Justice
Marshall outlined the broad sweep of
this power in Gibbons v. Ogden,49 where-
4C 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
4742 U.S.C. § 1985 (1964).
4 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
40 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
in he defined the determinative test as
simply being whether the activity regu-
lated is commerce which concerns more
than one state and has a substantial re-
lation to the national interest. In view
of the substantial impact the housing in-
dustry has upon interstate commerce,
there can be no doubt that it is embraced
under this congressional power.50  In
1965, the expenditure on residential hous-
ing totaled $27.6 billion in new private
investment.-" Mortgages are secured from
banks and insurance companies through-
out the country. For example, over six-
teen percent of the nearly fifteen million
single-family occupant-owned homes which
carried mortgages in 1960 were mort-
gaged to out-of-state lenders." Devel-
opers advertise for buyers in national
periodicals while local real estate markets
seek owners and tenants from multistate
metropolitan areas and through national
listings. 53  And finally, it is undeniable
that building materials and home furnish-
ings are both sold and shipped in inter-
state commerce. Thus, housing, as a
marketable commodity, is created, fi-
nanced, and sold in and through the
channels of interstate commerce. In ad-
dition, housing discrimination also in-
hibits the interstate movement of minority
51 1966 Hearings Before Subcomm. N. 5 at
1070.
5, Id. at 1071.
52 Id. Similarly, over fifty percent of the home
mortgages held by insurance companies were
held by insurance companies outside the mort-
gagor's home state. Id.
5 1966 Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 at
1071.
5 Id.
groups.5 '" Confronted with de facto ex-
clusion from most middle class neighbor-
hoods, many black Americans are loath
to move from one region to another since
they have dim prospects of obtaining
suitable housing accommodations. As a
result, the unemployed or unskilled black
American is deprived of an opportunity
to compete for surburban factory po-
sitions, while the skilled or professional
black American, rather than relocate in
an overcrowded slum area, does not
seek the enhanced employment opportun-
ities which the urban centers offer.5 6  It
is not surprising then, that housing dis-
crimination has been characterized as a
de facto barrier to the free movement of
the black American.
57
The fact that Congress enacted Title
VIII not to protect commerce, but to
remedy a social evil, is not of controlling
significance. The Supreme Court has
stated explicitly that "Congress was not
5 It has long been settled that the scope of
the commerce clause encompasses the move-
ment of people through the states. See, e.g.,
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941); Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470 (1917); Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849).
56 1966 Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 at
1372.
5- Id. at 1373. A similar argument was utilized
by the Supreme Court to sustain the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and in
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
There the Court held that it was rational for
Congress to conclude that discrimination in
hotels, restaurants, and other places of accom-
modation had a direct and highly restrictive
effect upon the interstate travel of black
Americans.
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restricted by the fact that the particular
obstruction to interstate commerce with
which it was dealing was also deemed
a moral and social wrong."58  Nor is
Congress' power in this area limited to the
mere regulation of persons or goods actu-
ally crossing state lines. The power of
Congress to promote interstate com-
merce also includes the power to reg-
ulate the local incidents thereof which
have a substantial effect upon that com-
merce.59 Indeed, in Wickard v. Filburn,60
the Supreme Court held that the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act could be validly
applied to a farmer who cultivated only
twenty-three acres of wheat, most of
which was consumed on his own farm.
Thus, accusations that the use of the
commerce clause to reach all private
housing amounts to "mere fantasy" and
"sheer subterfuge" 61 seem unfounded.
Similarly, former Attorney General Kat-
zenbach has pointed out that "when
the total problem is considered, it re-
58Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (discrimination in public
accommodations). See also, e.g., United-States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor
Standards Act); Brooks v. United States, 267
U.S. 432 (1925) (criminal enterprises); Weeks
v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1918) (mis-
branding of drugs); Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470 (1917) (Mann Act); Lottery
Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (gambling).
6 The Court has stated "if it is interstate com-
merce that feels the pinch, it does not matter
how local the operation that applies the
squeeze." United States v. Women's Sports-
wear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
See also, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
60317 U.S. 111 (1942).
61 1966 Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 at
1559.
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quires no great leap of the imagination
to conclude that interstate commerce is
significantly affected by the sale even
of single dwellings, multiplied many times
in each community." 62 In summary, he
stated that:
clearly the people, the money, the
materials, the entrepreneurial talent
which move in and to the housing
market are not confined within single
States. Rather they are well within
the range of congressional regulation,
and within this range Congress' judg-
ment as to what problems need solv-
ing and how they should be solved is
necessarily broad.63
6'-Id. at 1070-71.
631 d. at 1071-72.
64The tendencly of the Supreme Court has
been to expand the concept of "state action"
in order to maintain the viability of the four-
teenth amendment. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mul-
key, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (the right of private
individuals to discriminate may not be em-
bodied in a state constitution); Evans v. New-
ton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (Firmly established
tradition of municipal control prohibited trans-
fer of segregated public park to private trust-
ees. Use of the park on this segregated basis
had been granted the city under a will.);
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964)
(the specification of the race of a candidate
on a ballot was a form of state-assisted dis-
crimination); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267 (1963) (Conviction of civil rights demon-
strators under a criminal mischief statute in-
validated when utilized to enforce state segre-
gation policy. City officials had declared dem-
onstrations were not in the community inter-
est.); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961) (State lessee could not
exclude black Americans from his restaurant.
The degree of state involvement in the opera-
tions of the public corporation was deemed
controlling.); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (Judicial enforcement of racially re-
strictive covenants for benefit of third parties
prohibited); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (company-owned town performed a
B.) The Congressional Power to En-
force the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
1.) Congressional power to prohibit
state action.
The fourteenth amendment clearly pro-
hibits any state from discriminating among
its citizens on the basis of race, creed,
color, or sex. However, the concept of
"state action" has yet to be clearly de-
fined,64 for as the Supreme Court has
observed, "[o]nly by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the non-
obvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true sig-
nificance." 65 Sufficient facts and circum-
stances are available to formulate an
argument that the actions of a private
developer, such as Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
the respondent in Jones, can be char-
acterized as "state action". One may
contend that such a developer performs
a governmental function in establishing
and governing a community. For ex-
ample, in Marsh v. Alabama,6 6 the Su-
government function and was thus subject to
same constitutional prohibitions as state). See
generally Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875
and The Civil Rights Cases Revisited: State
Action, The Fourteenth Amendment, and
Housing, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 5 (1966); Hen-
kin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962);
Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State
Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957); Lewis, The
Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV.
1083 (1960); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Ac-
tion, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961).
65 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
6G326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Amalgamat-
ed Food Employee's Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
preme Court held that a company-owned
town could not utilize state criminal sanc-
tions to frustrate the right of a Jehovah
Witness to distribute religious literature.
An analogy can be drawn between this
type of company-owned town and mod-
ern subdivisions such as Paddock Woods,6 7
the development involved in Jones. Sup-
port for this analogy can also be found
in the white primary cases, 68 in which
the Supreme Court invalidated restrictions
on voting which had been enforced by
private groups. In Terry v. Adams,69
the Court held that the "Jaybird" party,
which did not enjoy any official state
recognition, but whose candidate tradition-
ally ran unopposed in the Democratic pri-
mary, could not deny a black American
the right to vote in its pre-primary pro-
cedure, solely because it was performing
a governmental function.
In the alternative, one may contend
that the state assistance a private de-
veloper receives, transforms his private
acts of discrimination to acts of the state
67 Such developments are often delegated the
right to control and regulate the community
during and after its construction by means of
covenants and taxing powers. They also hold
the power to assess and impose liens against
residents for community services which they
provide. The Marsh Court had been impressed
by the fact that the company town had all
the other characteristics of any other American
town. 326 U.S. at 502. Paddock Woods,
which encompassed residences for one thou-
sand people, shopping centers, banks, churches,
schools, country clubs and other facilities,
could also be characterized as such a totality.
6sSee Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). See
also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
69345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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itself.7 0  In almost every instance, the
private developer can rely on water and
sewage services, zoning and building
codes, licensed real estate agents, and
regulations concerning credit, mortgages,
and interest rates. In other situations,
the builder may also be the beneficiary
of the state's power of eminent domain,
of a state tax exemption, or perhaps even
direct financial assistance. A similar sit-
uation was presented in Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority,71 in which a
private restaurant had refused to serve a
black customer solely on the basis of
his race. The restaurant, a lessee in a
public parking garage built on public
land and dedicated to public use, was
partially tax-exempt, and played an in-
tegral role in the operating plans of the
state. The Supreme Court concluded
that the state had "so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence with
[the restaurant] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity, which, on that ac-
count, cannot be considered to have been
so 'purely private' as to fall without the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." 72
However, the fact remains that it would
be stretching the traditional "state action"
theory beyond recognition if one attempt-
ed to apply it to the private homeowners
covered by Title VIII. Thus if this state
action theory is to be utilized to justify
76See, e.g., Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,
299 N.Y. 512 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
981 (1950); Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179
F. Supp. 851 (D.C. Md. 1960); Johnson v.
Levitt & Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa.
1955).
71365 U.S. 715 (1961).
7 2 d. at 725.
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Title VIII, its use would be restricted to
large developers of subdivisions similar
to Paddock Woods.7 3  It must be noted,
however, that Paddock Woods both re-
ceived a substantial amount of state as-
sistance and exercised government func-
tions.7 1 Yet, in Jones, both lower fed-
eral courts rejected the "state action"
theory,75 and the Supreme Court, in turn,
placed reliance for its decision upon the
thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.
It has been suggested that the Jones
Court may have been "as leery of ex-
panding the 'state action' concept as it
was of abandoning it .. ," 70 However,
it is submitted that a realistic appraisal
of the traditional "state action" doctrine
would mandate its rejection in the area
of housing discrimination. Under the
traditional doctrine, a state is permitted
to remain neutral with respect to private
72 See generally Comment, Application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to Builders of Private
Housing, 12 KAN. L. REV. 426 (1964).
74 Paddock Woods would eventually house over
one thousand people and was only a part of
a large complex of similar housing subdivisions
previously developed by the defendants. Many
of these previous subdivisions were partially
financed by the Federal Housing Administra-
tion. The developer had laid out streets for
the use of the residents and had undertaken
to provide such community services as garbage
collection. The St. Louis County Planning
Commission had approved its plans and had
agreed to provide sewer installation and service.
The corporate real estate broker had been
licensed by the state. The developer had also
appointed a board of trustees to provide com-
munity services, granting them the legal autho-
rity to levy assessments and to enforce them
through judicial action.
l,'255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966), a/ld,
379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
7037 FORDHAM L. REV. 277, 283 (1968).
discrimination, i.e., there is no positive
duty on the state to act in this area.7 7
Congress' power under the fourteenth
amendment has traditionally been limited
to those situations in which the state is
guilty of affirmative action which Con-
gress can rationally characterize as pre-
senting the danger of discrimination. 8
The existence of private discrimination
then is dependent upon the passive ac-
ceptance and inaction of the state. In
the circumstances presented by the urban
ghetto, the state must be regarded as a
"necessary, silent and willing partner, sig-
nificantly involved in the tacit encourage-
ment, authorization and perpetuation of
acts of racial discrimination and racial in-
justice."' 7  As one commentator elo-
quently stated, "[w]hen a racial minority
is struggling to escape drowning in the
isolation and squalor of slum-ghetto resi-
dence, everywhere across the country, I
do not see why the refusal to throw a
life-preserver does not amount to a de-
nial of protection." 10
2.) The Congressional power to en-
force the equal protection clause by pro-
hibiting private acts of discrimination.
77See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967). See generally Morris and Powe, Jr.,
Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open
Housing, 44 WAst. L. REV. 1, 14-18 (1968).
70See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966). See generally Morris and Powe,
Jr., Constitutional and Statutory Rights to
Open Housing, 44 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14-18
(1968).
7 Morris and Powe, Jr., Constitutional and
Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1968).
81, Black, Forward: "State Action," Equal Pro-
tection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARv. L. REV. 69, 73 (1967).
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,81 the Court
examined the constitutionality of the 1965
Voting Rights Act, 82 which provided, in
part, that no person who successfully com-
pleted the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican
school should be denied the right to
vote because of inability to read or write
English. The Court, citing South Car-
olina v. Katzenbach,8 3 upheld the legis-
lation as an appropriate means to en-
force the equal protection clause. It re-
jected the contention that Congress' pow-
er under section five was limited to pro-
hibiting state action which denied the equal
protection of the laws. Instead, the Court
ruled that Congress was free to prohibit
any activity which, while not of itself
violative of equal protection, might ra-
tionally be construed as creating the dan-
ger of state discrimination. Thus, the
broad meaning of the necessary and prop-
er clause was implied in section five's
power to "enforce". The Court reasoned
that the enfranchisement of Spanish-speak-
ing citizens would protect them from un-
constitutional discrimination by the state
in the provision of public services, such
as education, public housing, fire and
police protection, and access to the courts.
Title VIII of the 1968 Act has sim-
ilar objectives. It represents an attempt
R8 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
81 42 U.S.C. § 1973(e), 79 Stat. 439 (Supp.
II 1964).
83 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Here the Court upheld
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 under section 2
of the fifteenth amendment. Congress was
regarded as possessing the power to enact mea-
sures which prohibited conduct creating a dan-
ger of discrimination. The broad meaning of
the Constitution's necessary and proper clause
was thus read into the enforcement section of
the fifteenth amendment.
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to eliminate the second-class citizenship
which is fostered by the urban ghetto-
squalid housing, limited job opportunities,
unemployment, low pay, exploitation by
landlords, shopkeepers and employers, and
police brutality. Robert Weaver, former
Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, has identified the urban ghettoes
as the "areas where the public facilities
are usually-and the public services are
of the least quality, the lowest quality."' 4
Nor can one dispute the inferior quality
of education available in the ghetto. The
United States Commission on Civil Rights
reported in 1967 that segregation in the
public school system had increased dur-
ing the past fifteen years.8 5  This segre-
gation has had a catastrophic effect, both
culturally 86 and psychologically, 81 upon
black students. Inferior education, in
turn, affects the black American's ability
to compete equally in the employment
market. In addition, the danger of a state
denial of equal protection, which was
created by the English literacy tests in
Morgan, is analogous to the danger creat-
ed by the denial of the right to live where
one pleases. The de facto segregation
of the non-white minorities in the urban
ghetto deprives them of the voting power
they would normally possess as a "swing
group." It accomplishes this result by
forcing those minorities to remain in the
ghetto, where the effect of their voting
84 1966 Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 at
1373.
-5 1967 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Racial Isolation in
the Public Schools, at 8, 199.
s, Id.
871Id. at 104. See also Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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power is minimized since it is limited
to the election of a limited number of
representatives.
Morgan then, would provide the power
to eliminate housing segregation as an
obstacle to the state's duty to provide
public facilities on a nondiscriminatory
basis. One problem arises at this point.
The legislation in Morgan dealt with state
action-the New York English literacy
test-while Title VIII deals exclusively
with private discrimination. The four-
teenth amendment, has traditionally been
interpreted as restricting the scope of
congressional power under section five to
affirmative state action. Thus, while the
Morgan legislation met this requirement,
private acts of discrimination in the area
of housing would not. The Supreme Court
recently indicated in United States v.
Guest,88 however, that it may now be
willing to accept the proposition that
section 5 authorizes Congress to imple-
ment the equal protection clause by ap-
propriate legislation which controls even
private conduct.
In Guest, defendants were indicted un-
der section 241 80 for conspiring to inter-
fere with a black American's right to
equal utilization of public facilities own-
ed by the State of Georgia. Since the
indictment was construed to aver the in-
volvement of state officials in the con-
spiracy, the Court was not compelled to
define the precise scope of the fourteenth
88383 U.S. 745 (1965).
89 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). Section 241 pun-
ishes interference with "any right or privi-
lege secured . . . by the Constitution or laws
of the United States .... ." The victim of the
Guest conspiracy had been murdered while
driving through Georgia.
amendment's power to prohibit private
discrimination. Nevertheless, six Justices,
in two separate concurring opinions, stat-
ed in dictum that section five of the
fourteenth amendment empowered Con-
gress to punish all conspiracies that in-
terfere with fourteenth amendment rights.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas,
stated that the equal utilization of state
facilities was a right secured by the Con-
stitution within the meaning of section
241.10 Similarly, Mr. Justice Clark, join-
ed in a concurrence by Justices Black and
Fortas, stated "[t]here can be no doubt
that the specific language of § 5 em-
powers the Congress to enact laws pun-
ishing all conspiracies-with or without
state action-that interfere with four-
teenth amendment rights." 91 Observing
this, Mr. Justice Brennan noted that the
Civil Rights Cases had limited Congress'
power under section 5 to the correction
of prohibited state action. He concluded:
"I do not accept-and a majority of the
Court today rejects-this interpretation of
§ 5 ".92
One must reject, however, the impli-
cation that the state action require-
ment has been completely abandoned by
the Court.93 An acceptance of this im-
90 383 U.S. at 774.
91 Id. at 762.
92 Id. at 783.
93 Mr. Justice Brennan stated at one point:
"[wihatever may be the status of the right to
equal utilization of privately owned facilities,
. . we are here concerned with the right
to equal utilization of public facilities owned
or operated by or on behalf of the State."
Id. at 780-81. Thus he makes clear that there
must exist a relationship between the state
and the individual. He specified the type of
plication would leave congressional power
under the fourteenth amendment wholly
unconfined. In order to correctly under-
stand the implications of Guest, the
meaning which the Court attributed to
the phrase "Fourteenth Amendment
rights" must be clarified. Traditionally,
the only right a citizen possessed under
the fourteenth amendment was the right
not to be discriminated against by the
state. In Guest however, it was recog-
nized that every prohibition implies the
positive existence of a right.9 4 The Guest
court merely adopted the proposition that
Congress may protect from private inter-
ference the citizen's right not to be dis-
criminated against by the state in the
public services which it performs. Thus,
the Guest rationale would not provide
substantive support for Congressional leg-
islation prohibiting private discrimination
unless it was related in some manner
to the goals of equal protection.
The Guest dictum makes it possible to
apply the Morgan rationale to open hous-
ing legislation. Congress recognized that
segregated housing impeded the states
from performing their obligation under
relationship necessary when he declared that
the right to use state facilities without dis-
crimination on the basis of race is a right
arising out of the fourteenth amendment.
See Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment,
Congressional Power, and Private Discrimina-
tion: United States v. Guest, 14 U.S.C.A.L.
REV. 553 (1967).
91 Mr. Justice Brennan stated: "[t]he Four-
teenth Amendment commands the State to pro-
vide the members of all races with equal ac-
cess to the public facilities it owns or man-
ages, and the right of a citizen to use those
facilities without discrimination on the basis
of race is a basic corollary of this command."
383 U.S. at 780.
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the fourteenth amendment to promote
equal access and equal opportunity in all
public aspects of community life. Title
VIII embodies this legislative judgment,
and as such, is authorized by the four-
teenth amendment.
Conclusion
The conditions and philosophy of
modern society are different from
those of 1868. The first requires and
the second encompasses affirmative
state action to provide both national
welfare and human rights."!
During the past century, it has become
increasingly evident that the mere in-
validation of discriminatory state laws will
not preserve the equality and freedom
proclaimed by the post-Civil War Amend-
ments. The Supreme Court has re-
sponded to this realization with several
far-reaching decisions in the area of na-
tional power to protect civil rights. Jones
recognized Congress' power under the
thirteenth amendment to prohibit all dis-
crimination which it rationally construes
as imposing badges or incidents of slav-
ery. Similarly, Morgan represented an
expansion of Congress' power under the
fourteenth amendment. The Morgan
Court broadly construed the word "en-
force" in section five to enable Congress
to prohibit non-discriminatory state ac-
tivities which presented the danger of a
denial of equal protection by that state.
And finally, in Guest, the Court further
expanded section five to prohibit private
9. Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, Fore-
word: ConstitutionaIl A djudication ind the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 91, 114 (1966).
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acts of discrimination which presented an
obstacle to the state's duty not to dis-
criminate. In each case, the Court has
the power of Congress to prohibit con-
duct which is not in itself violative of any
amendment. Since the Court has hes-
itated to define the thirteenth amendment
as self-executing, the judiciary cannot act
on its own initiative to hold a particular
act of discrimination as imposing a badge
of slavery. Under the fourteenth amend-
ment, the judiciary continues to retain
its traditional role of examining the con-
stitutionality of state and federal legisla-
tion. These decisions then, represent a
judicial realization that the scope and
implementation of the affirmative duties
which must be assumed by the federal
government can be better defined by leg-
islation rather than adjudication ."
This series of decisions is notable in
another respect. They represent a firm
judicial challenge to Congress to re-
spond to the pressing needs of our so-
ciety. Thus far, Congress has responded
to this challenge by utilizing the broad
powers recognized by Morgan and Guest
to enact Title VIII of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act, an open-housing law much
broader in scope than the 1866 Act.
In doing so, Congress has reached out to
9GIndeed, in Guest, Mr. Justice Brennan speci-
fically stated that "Congress, not the judiciary,
was viewed as the more likely agency to im-
plement fully the guarantees of equality, and
thus it could be presumed the primary purpose
of the Amendments was to augment the power
of Congress, not the judiciary." 383 U.S. at
783. See generally Cox, supra note 95.
combat the source of our current racial
problems-the urban ghetto. Both the
Court and Congress have now recognized
that the urban ghetto causes not only
racial alienation and de facto segregation
in schools, but also discrimination in
employment and interference with the
non-white minority's right to equal pro-
tection of the laws. If the present Con-
gressional prohibitions against housing
segregation are effective, it is hoped that
the concept of racial inferiority and the
caste system which has developed as
a consequence of it will both be destroyed.
However, in the event that this caste
system does not crumble, Congress must
utilize its broad powers in a continuing
effort to destroy it. If Congress' re-
sponse does falter, it is quite probable
that the Supreme Court will speedily con-
fer self-executing status upon the thir-
teenth amendment. This would enable
the Court to act on its own initiative in
the prohibition of various forms of pri-
vate discrimination which impose badges
or incidents of slavery upon black Amer-
icans. In addition, there is a distinct
possibility that the Court, if necessary,
will also expand the traditional doctrine
of "state action" to encompass a state's
failure to protect an individual from pri-
vate discrimination. In conclusion, it is
certain that the law will continue to be
utilized in an attempt to complete "the
joyous consumation of abolition." 97
97 TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 162-63
(1965).
